Question about IPAM tools for v6
fernando at gont.com.ar
Fri Jan 31 17:35:30 CET 2014
On 01/31/2014 01:12 PM, Alexandru Petrescu wrote:
>>> This is not a problem of implementation, it is a problem of unspoken
>>> assumption that the subnet prefix is always 64.
>> Do you know what they say assumptions? -- "It's the mother of all f*
>> It's as straightforward as this: whenever you're coding something,
>> enforce limits. And set it to a sane default. And allow the admin to
>> override it when necessary.
> I tend to agree, but I think you talk about a different kind of limit.
> This kind of limit to avoid memory overflow, thrashing, is not the same
> as to protect against security attacks.
What's the difference between the two? -- intention?
> The protocol limit set at 64 (subnet size) is not something to prevent
> attacks. It is something that allows new attacks.
What actually allows attacks are bad programming habits.
The /64 has exposed bad programming habits.. that's it.
> An implementation that will restrict the size of an instantiation of a
> data structure (say,limit its size to a max hosting 2^32 nodes) will be
> a clear limit to something else: subnets that want to be of that
> particular 2^32 size.
You cannot be something that you cannot handle. I can pretend to be
Superman... but if after jumping over the window somehow I don't start
flying, the thing ain't working.... and won't be funny when I hit the floor.
Same thing here: Don't pretend to be able t handle a /32 when you can't.
In practice, you won't be able to handle 2**32 in the NC.
Take the /64 as "Addresses could be spread all over this /64" rather
than "you must be able to handle 2**64 addresses on your network".
> Also, think that people who develop IP stacks don't necessarily think
> Ethernet, they think many other link layers. Once that stack gets into
> an OS as widespread as linux, there is little control about which link
> layer the IP stack will run on. Actually there they want no limit at all.
> It is not as simple as saying it is programmer's fault.
Not enforcing limits is a programmer's fault. Most security exploits
rely on that.
>>> It is unspoken because
>>> it is little required (almost none) by RFCs. Similarly as when the
>>> router of the link is always the .1.
>> That's about sloppy programming.
>> Train yourself to do the right thing. I do. When I code, I always
>> enforce limits. If anything, just pick one, and then tune it.
> I am trained thank you.
What I meant was: one should train oneself such that you don't really
need to think about it. Enforcing limits is one of those. First thing
your brain must be trained to is that before you allocate a data
structure, you check how big the thing is, and how big it's supposed to be.
And it's not just limits. e.g., how many *security* tools need superuser
privileges, but will never give up such superuser privileges once they
are not needed anymore?
"Know thyself" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Know_thyself). I know my
code is not going to be as good as it should. So I better limit the
damage that it can cause: enforce limits, and release unnecessary
privileges. And fail on the safe side. You could see it as
e-mail: fernando at gont.com.ar || fgont at si6networks.com
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